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Research Article Open access CC BY 4.0

Evolution Model Analysis of Group Buying Games

Ya-Lan Li, Qi-Qing Song

Current Journal of Applied Science and Technology · pp. 1–8 · Published 26 Nov 2015

10.9734/BJAST/2016/22839

Abstract

This paper introduces an evolutionary game model in a mixed population. The simulation results show that competition between suppliers increases social welfare and can reveals the base price of a product in cases of some strategy profiles; however, collusion will benefit suppliers. The bounded rationality of individuals has important influence on the coexistence of suppliers.  

Group buying evolutionary games bounded rationality

References (5)

  1. 1 Quantity Discounts: Managerial Issues and Research Opportunities [DOI]
  2. 2 Unraveling quantity discounts☆ [DOI]
  3. 3 Potentially self-defeating: Group buying in a two-tier supply chain [DOI]
  4. 4 Quantity Discounts: An Overview and Practical Guide for Buyers and Sellers [DOI]
  5. 5 An evolutionary approach for product line adaptation [DOI]

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