Evolution Model Analysis of Group Buying Games

Ya-Lan Li; Qi-Qing Song

doi:10.9734/BJAST/2016/22839

Research Article Open access CC BY 4.0

Evolution Model Analysis of Group Buying Games

Ya-Lan Li, Qi-Qing Song

Current Journal of Applied Science and Technology · pp. 1–8 · Published 26 Nov 2015

10.9734/BJAST/2016/22839

Abstract

This paper introduces an evolutionary game model in a mixed population. The simulation results show that competition between suppliers increases social welfare and can reveals the base price of a product in cases of some strategy profiles; however, collusion will benefit suppliers. The bounded rationality of individuals has important influence on the coexistence of suppliers.

Group buying evolutionary games bounded rationality

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Ya-Lan Li, Qi-Qing Song (2015). Evolution Model Analysis of Group Buying Games. Current Journal of Applied Science and Technology , 1–8. https://doi.org/10.9734/BJAST/2016/22839

Affiliations

Ya-Lan Li — College of Science, Guilin University of Technology, Guilin 541004, China
Qi-Qing Song — College of Science, Guilin University of Technology, Guilin 541004, China

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