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Research Article Open access CC BY 4.0

Defense Strategies of Listed Companies under Hostile Takeover: A Case Study

Junlin Luo, Cui Guo, Shenshen Hu

Journal of Economics, Management and Trade · pp. 1–10 · Published 3 Aug 2017

10.9734/JEMT/2017/34882

Abstract

There are many brilliant, far-reaching and complex hostile takeover cases in China's capital market in recent years. Hostile acquisition has both pros and cons. On one hand, for the inefficient companies, it is an important external governance mechanism, which can solve the agency problem effectively. On the other hand, for the efficient corporates, it will damage the company structure, administration model, and corporate culture. This paper analyzes the hostile takeover of listed companies, the Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) defense strategies and establishes a corporate anti-takeover system for listed companies through a specific case, which can help regulating takeover and the M&A defense of listed companies and promote the sustained steady development of the listed companies and capital market.

Hostile takeover ownership structure mergers and acquisitions defense corporate governance

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